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----c! :cs~;;~;;.:; c~~r+:--u"t~i;---
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tion, KENT HOYT, SMITH WELD-
ING AND STEEL, et al, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
ST A TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendants-Respondents herein agree with Plaintiff-
'\[lpellanl's statement as to the nature of the case. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
Defendants-Respondents agree with Plaintiff-A 
l t ' t t · · · PPel. an s s a ement as to the disposition in the lo\"er ' coun 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request that the decision of the low, 
court be affirmed and they be awarded their cost of th~, 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents admit the Appellant's contract with Ce-
dar City Corporation and the Federal Aviation Agency 
and its subcontract with M & S Construction and Engi· 
neering Company and also that Respondents furnished 
labor and materials to said project at the instance of ill 
& S Construction. Respondents deny that they failed to 
give notice to the Appellant within the time required 
but affirmatively allege and represent that both Re· 
spondents gave sufficient and adequate notice to the 
Appellant pursuant to the law. 
It is correct that the defendants Smith, performed 
labor and services for M & S Construction from Auguq 
1, 1963, to and including September 25, 1963. That there· I 
after no formal notice was sent by Smith to anyone con· / 
nected with the project except M & S Construct101 1 
until on or about December 5, 1963, at which timt 
the said Smith discussed the matter personally 111111 
Jack Whiting, one of the owners of Whiting Bro: 
Construction. At that time Jack Whiting and Willi 
ing Bros. Construction were aware that 1VI & S Con 
struction was not going to complete its contract as 1: 1 
· o t le"'' ' was removing its equipment from the Job. n a ' 
· h" th t few da\' two occasions thereafter, and wit m e nex . ·.
1 
the said Smith agai~ discussed th: bill with Jack i~1 ~1'.;. 
incr who assured Smith that all bills would be pa 
o Th t ther1 cause all principal parties were bonded. a 
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f1el' and on or about December 27, 1963, Smith received 
a copy of the letter from one Lloyd D. George, Attorney 
for Whiting Bros. Construction Company, reference to 
whicl1 i::: made in more detail, hereafter. 
With respect to the Respondent Hoyt, he also con-
tracted with M & S Construction to furnish a welding 
1iJa.rhine aiid certain supplies on a monthly basis com-
mencing September 17, 1963, and ending December 17, 
1%:}, at an agreed price of $150.00 per month. That on 
or about December 5, 1963, the M & S Construction start-
ed pulling its equipment off the job as it was no longer 
able to perform its agreed contract. That on December 
5, 1963, Hoyt contacted James H. Mendenhall, Vice 
President and Superintendent of M & S Construction 
relative to his bill whereupon Mendenhall executed an 
assignment in favor of Hoyt on funds owing from Whit-
ing Bros. Construction. On that same date the assign-
ment was delivered to Jack Whiting at Cedar City, Utah, 
with a full explanation to Whiting of the purpose, nature, 
and reason for the assignment. Hoyt was assured by Jack 
Whiting that a check for the amount due ($565.00) 
would be sent from Whiting's office in Las Vegas, Neva-
da on the bus to Cedar City the following day. On De-
CPmber 6, 1963, Jack Whiting informed Hoyt and Smith, 
that all amounts then due and owing to M & S Construc-
tion had been previously assigned to a bank in Clearfield, 
Utah. Thereupon, Whiting assured both Smith and Hoyt 
that Lherc were various bonds in existence to protect 
everyone concerned with the project. Thereafter, and 
on other occasions, both Hoyt and Smith were assured 
by Jack Whitning that everything was being done to 
protect the various creditors. 
On or about December 27, 1963, Hoyt also received 
a mimeographed copy of the letter sent by one Lloyd D. 
George, Attorney for Whiting Bros. Construction, rela-
ti\C: to the situation with M and S Construction and the 
PetYH1~llt of the various creditors. 
It is the co~1tention of the Respondents, although ad-
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mitting that no formal demand was made upon the 
Appellant by registered mail as set forth in the statute 
that the meaning and purpose of the law was complied 
with and it would be inequitable and unjust to permit 
the Appellants to escape liability on a technicality of 
law not contemplated by the law itself. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RE.SPONDENTS .SMITH AND HOYT GAVE ADE-
QUATE AND SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO APPEL-
LANT WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENT OF 
THE STATUTE. 
The appellant has set forth the Statute in its brief in 
detail at page 5 thereof and the same is incorporated 
herein by reference. The important part thereof and the 
portion \vith which we are concerned, in substance states, 
that for a materialman or a subcontractor to have a 
cause of action over and against the prime contractor, 
he must give written notice within ninety days after 
the last work performed or material furnished to the 
prime contractor, stating with substantial accuracy the 
amount claimed and the name of the party to whom the 
material was furnished or supplied or for whom the 
labor was done or performed. 
It should first be noted, and the case so hold, that 
the statute involved is remedial and under the authori-
ties should be liberally construed. United States for the 
Use of Hallenbeck v. Fleisher Engineering and Construc-
tion Co., 2 Cir., 107 F2d 295, affimed 311 U. S. 15, S. ct. 
81, 85 L. Ed. 12. Also, that the provisions of the statute 
have been held to be directory rather than mandatory. 
The appellant raises the additional requirement that 
t:ic notice or claim must demand that the prime con-
tractor pay the debt but there is nothing in the statute 
of this nature. 
The notice provision of the Miller Act has been given 
a liberal construction in many cases, the courts holding 
that the main purpose of the provision is to insure that 
tlw gP11cral contractor has knowledge of the claim and 
the circumstances surrounding it, and that if it can be 
<iown that the general contracto;: has such knowledge, 
lb.e notice may be regarded as sufficient despite the fact 
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that the formalities of the notice prnvision may not ho . 
been met. ult 
Very briefly and in view of the fmeaoing le·t' . 1 k 
0 , s ou· 
at the facts. On December 5, 1963, Whiting Bros. knei" 
that M & S ~onstruction could not and did not intend 
to complete its subcontract. It was also aware that ii 
general assignment of all funds owing to M & s Coii-
struction had been made to a third party not connected 
with the project either as a supplier or laborer. Both 
Smith and Hoyt discussed their accounts, both as to 1 
amount and nature, with Jack Whiting on or about that 
same date and on various other occasions thereafter 
and further they each received a letter from Whitino 
b 
Bros. Construction directed to and acknowledging that 
they and each of them, were creditors of M & S Con· 
struction on that same project. 
POINT II 
THE LETTER OF APPELLANT'S COUNSEL SENT 
TO RESPONDENTS SMITH AND HOYT WAS AN 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THEIR CLAIM AND AP· 
PELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING LACK 
OF NOTICE. 
The letter in question (R 19-21) was dated Decembc1 
26 1063 and was received by both Smith and Hoyt with· 
' ' in a day or two thereafter. The letter is directed to cred· 
itors of M & S Construction and sent to each of the Re· 
spondents herein which would clearly indicate knowlegc 
on the part of Whiting Bros. Construction that these 
individuals had a claim. The letter acknowledges mone.i 1 
in the hands of Whiting Bros. Construction which be· 
longed to M & S Construction and its creditors and on 
page 2 of said letter the method by which creditors m~ 1 
expect payment is also outlined. Also, in the last paic1 
d·t rs thal 1 graph on page 2, the letter also persuade ere 1 o . '· 
they are not being mislead or misdirected and the 011 ~' 
· l tter 111 question is who is entitled to the funds. This e 
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1'(Jlljtmdin11 "·ith Jack ·whiting's assurance that the 
1·J;1i111 ;11 its !tc1 d no t't'ason lo be concerned for their money 
in vievv of the tact that all parties were bonded con-
' stitutes notice, reasonable reliance by the claimants 
which would in turn estop the Appellant from now claim-
ing lack of proper notice. In support of this contention 
Respondents cite the case of United States use of Hop-
per Bros. Quarries vs. Peerless Casualty Co. 255 F2d 137, 
cert den 358 U S 831, 3 L ed 2nd 69, 79 S ct. 51, and 
further cited in 78 ALR 2d at page 430. In that case the 
claimant had sent a letter to the general contractor with-
in the 90 day period seeking information with respect 
to its bill and the general contractor had referred the 
claimant to the subcontractors' bonding company. The 
court concluded that the general contractor had misled 
the claimant and lured him into not perfecting a notice 
by referring to the subcontractor's bonding company 
as a possible source for the claimant to recover pay-
ment, when, in fact, only the general contractor could 
s.ue on this bond, and the general contractor knew that 
it alone was liable to the claimant if he was unable to 
recover from the subcontractor. The court continued: 
"The inevitable effect of the answer so volunteered by 
the contractor was to prevent plaintiff from taking ad-
vice or adding anything to the written notice of the 
claim which it had given to the contractor in its 
letter. Plaintiff had reason to believe that the contractor 
found the written notice sufficient and it would be un-
conscionable to permit the contractor and the bonds-
man to escape their just obligation to pay because of 
any deficiency in what was, under the circumstances, a 
matter of form, and that deficiency in form was attrib-
utable to their own conduct. There can be no claim 
that any substantial right of any of the parties was in 
and degree affected by the omission from the written 
notice of the dollars and cents due and the defendants 
in this action are plainly estopped to defeat recovery 
on that ground. To hold otherwise would be to exalt 
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form over substance and frustrate the purpose for whil':, 
the Act was passed." · 
The cases all seem to agree that the purpose of the 
statute is for the protection of materialmen and labor-
ers and that the general contractor and his surety 
should not be permitted to avoid its obligations ansin~ 
from contracts within the meaning and scope of th; 
statute upon technicalities not contemplated by the Jaii. 
The purpose of the statute was intended for two mai:' 
purposes, namely, that the general contractor be placed 
on notice of a claim against a subcontractor and the 1 
amount thereof and then, secondly, to permit the gen 
eral contractor to withhold any further funds due thP 
subcontractor until the claims are settled. In the instant 
case, on the date that prime contractor was first con-
tacted by the two Respondents, the suucontractor, Ml( 
:::> Construction, was imlling oft the jou and did no1 u1· 1 
tend to complete the contract, which the Appellant weu 
knew. The Appellant was i11 possession ot all mone,1 
then due M & S Construct10n .l:ur the work done to dale, 
as evidenced by the subsequent letter in question herern 
(R 19-20-21.), and thereafter, the Appellant obtained ail 
other monies aue on the subcu{ltract as it, the Appeila11., 
completed the remainder oi the subcontract. The gener"' 
contractor (Appellant) was then in a position to adt· 
quately protect itself and did so, to the injury of \Le 
l\,espondents and other claimants. 
Two further cases are cited in support ot Respondeni' 
view, although there are many others to the same elicLi, 
but none tound by the hespondents so closely on "'' 
tour with the instant case. ln the case of Houston f 11' 
and Casualty Insurance Company vs. United States 0 i 
America for the Use and Benefit of the Trane Cornpaii.'· 
'.::!17 F 2d 727 annotated in rl8 ALR 2d 435, wherein tlii 
representativ~ of the materialman had talked with'' 
representative of the prime contractor with fefere!l'-' 
to the bill and the amount owing and the prime suG 
contractor had subsequently and in writing al'.kn°
111 
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cdgccl the conversation, there being no express or ex-
p!ici1 writing from the materialman to the prime con-
trn1co1, and the court therein held "It is not necessary 
that tlte writing relied on be signed by the supplier, it 
io: :o.ufficient that there exists a writing from which, in 
connection with oral testimony, it plainly appears that 
the nature and state of the indebtedness was brought 
home to the general contractor. When this appears the 
object of the statute, to assure that the contractor will 
have notice, is attained and the statute is sufficiently 
complied with." 
In Coffee vs. United States (1946, CA5 Fla.) 157 F2d 
'.!lii'l, annotated in 78 ALR 2d 433,, the plaintiff therein 
!1,1d visited one of the partners comprising the prime 
( ontrador and had advised him of the balance due from 
a ~;ubcontractor, and at the same time handing the part-
ner a statement in writing of the sums claimed to be 
cL1e for the work although there was no showing that 
the p:=irlner (prime contractor) in fact accepted actual 
delivery and possession of the statement the court ther-
in held "In the case now before us we hold that a writ-
ing containing the information which the stature re-
quires, exhibited to the contractor by the claimant as a 
notice of his claim and which the contractor examines 
and discusses it and might have taken if he desired, as 
a written notice sufficiently served." 
With respect to the third point raised by the Appel-
lant it its brief, namely, that the defendants Smith and 
Hoyt had no express or implied contract with the plain-
tiff, surfice it to say that the defendants therein and the 
RPsponclcnts herein do not contend any contractural 
obligation between themselves and the Appellant herein 
! Prime con tractor) except insofar as a contractural 
obligation is created by the Miller Act itself, the statute 
"rith which we are concerned. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants submit to this court, as their conclusion, 
that based on the authorities herein cited and upon the 
law as it is written and taking into consideration the 
nature and purpose of the law and the fact situation 
as herein set forth, that the lower court properly eon-
cluded that the defendants Smith and Hoyt were entit· 
led to a judgment against the plaintiff therein and that 
the action of the lower court should be affirmed with 
costs given to these defendants. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ROBERT L. GARDNER 
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